Joshua Rust: Are Ethicists Ethical? Empirical Support for Aristotle's Moral Particularism

ARE ETHICISTS ETHICAL? EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR ARISTOTLE’S MORAL PARTICULARISM

Joshua Rust
Stetson University
jrust@stetson.edu

For ancient scholars the behavior of a philosopher who endorsed an ethical theory was considered evidence for or against that theory. While the conduct of a particular ethicist is no longer admissible as relevant to the standing of a theory, in this essay I contend that Aristotle’s moral particularism best explains a collection of empirical data concerning the behavior of ethicists as a whole. In the past year I have helped Professor Eric Schwitzgebel amass empirical data concerning the degree to which professors of ethics are, themselves, ethical. In this presentation I intend to both present some of those findings and offer some suggestions as to whether those findings are philosophically significant. After reviewing generalist and particularist explanations of the data, I will draw the tentative conclusion that a version of Aristotelian particularism best accommodates the data.

Are ethicists ethical? The studies

The empirical data come in two varieties. First, we surveyed people’s attitudes regarding the moral competence of ethics professors. [Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, "The Moral Behavior of Ethicists: Peer Opinion," unpublished (2007).] Second, Schwitzgebel sought evidence that spoke directly for or against the behavior of ethicists. [Eric Schwitzgebel, "Do Ethicists Steal More Books?," unpublished (2007).]

At the 2007 Pacific APA conference we set up a table and invited philosophers to fill out a brief survey. The sign on the table said, “Fill out a 5-minute philosophical-scientific questionnaire, get four Ghirardelli chocolate squares!”. Over the course of the conference 277 people completed the survey.

The survey aimed to excavate philosophers’ attitudes concerning the behavior of ethics professors. While two versions of the survey were distributed, I will focus on the first version as the significance of the results of the second version are less easy to discern. In the first survey the respondent was asked to judge whether she/he thought that, on the whole, ethicists behaved better, worse, or about the same as, first, other philosophers who did not specialize in ethics and, second, non-academics of a similar social background. On both of these questions, the respondent was asked to locate ethicists on a 7-point scale, where 1 was labeled “substantially morally better” than non-ethicists, 4 was labeled “about the same”, and 7 was labeled “substantially morally worse.”

Following the two questions about ethicists, the respondent was then asked how professors specializing in Metaphysics and Epistemology compare to other professors in the field, and how they compare to non-academics of a similar social background.

The remaining questions were either demographic (field of study, level of academic achievement, etc.), or else attempted to establish whether the respondent had prior knowledge of the contents of the survey.

The results of the survey are as follows. Of the 138 people who took the first version of the questionnaire, ethicists tended to rate ethicists behave slightly better than non-ethicists (3.4 vs. 4) [although it is worth pointing out that just over 50% of ethicist respondents did not rate ethicists any higher than non-ethicist philosophers], whereas non-ethicist philosophers think that ethicists behave no better than other philosophers (4). Both groups saw philosophers as less ethically delinquent than non-philosophers (3.8 or 3.6 vs. 4).

Mean responses to survey 1 by specialization.
1 = “substantially morally better”, 4 = “about the same”, 7 = “substantially morally worse”
Ethicist respondents:
1) ethicists vs. other philosophers: 3.4 (p = .01)
2) ethicists vs. non-academics: 3.1 (p = .00)
3) M&E vs. other philosophers: 4.3 (p = .01)
4) M&E vs. non-academics: 3.8 (p = .20)

Non-ethicist respondents:
1) ethicists vs. other philosophers: 4.0 (p = 1.00)
2) ethicists vs. non-academics: 3.7 (p = .47)
3) M&E vs. other philosophers: 4.0 (p = .73)
4) M&E vs. non-academics: 3.6 (p = .00)

The aforementioned survey reveals our attitudes towards the behavior of ethicists. Those attitudes bear a telling, but tenuous relation to the actual moral standing of ethicists. To more directly address the question, Schwitzgebel reviewed the rates at which approximately 200 ethics and non-ethics philosophical books were listed as missing in 32 leading academic libraries. He found that, as a percentage of books off-shelf (either checked out or missing), ethics books were significantly more likely to be missing (8.7%) as compared to non-ethics books (6.9%). Ethics books were about 25% more likely to be missing than philosophy books specializing in other fields.

Libraries: 13 leading U.S. academic libraries (Harvard, Berkeley, etc.) and 19 leading British libraries (Oxford, Cambridge, etc.)
Books: Approx. 200 matched ethics and non-ethics books, 1960 or later, reviewed in Phil Review, 1990-2001, or appearing in at least 5 SEP bibliographies.
Raw numbers:
Ethics Books:
1) Holdings: 14,517
2) Out or missing: 3,721
3) Overdue or missing: 498
4) Missing (incl. 1 year overdue): 323
Non-Ethics Books:
1) Holdings: 9,608
2) Out or missing: 1,775
3) Overdue or missing: 186
4) Missing (incl. 1 year overdue): 123
Percentages and ratios:
Overdue or missing, as a percentage of those off-shelf: Ethics: 13.4%, Non-ethics: 10.5%
Missing, as a percentage of those off-shelf: Ethics: 8.7%, Non-ethics: 6.9%
Odds Ratio: Ethics % missing : Non-ethics % missing: 1.25 (p = .02)

Re: older books. Excluding pre-1985 books:
Mean age of book: ethics: 1993.0, non-ethics: 1992.7
Missing as percentage of off shelf: ethics: 7.7%, non-ethics: 5.7%
Odds ratio: 1.35 (p = .01)
Re: more popular books. Excluding books occuring 5+ times in SEP:
Off-shelf as a percent of holdings: ethics: 15.5%, non-ethics: 16.1%
Missing as a percentage of off shelf: ethics: 8.5%, non-ethics: 5.7%
Odds ratio: 1.48 (p = .03)

The books-study points to a greater tendency among students and teachers of ethics to irresponsibly handle library books. The survey of attitudes may be taken to bespeak of a kind of skepticism many philosophers seem to hold concerning ethical theory’s ability to make a difference in our lives. In a more generous mode, we might fully expect ethicists to benefit from the course of study they have pursued. Shouldn’t we expect the study of ethics to make some difference in the life of the inquirer? Indeed, ethicists think this as they tended to rate ethicists better than non-ethicists. But non-ethicists do not expect ethicists to behave better than non-ethicist philosophers. Moreover, the book-study, where ethicists appear to be more ethically delinquent than non-ethicists, points to the possibility that epistemologists and metaphysicians are not skeptical enough.

There is an explanatory gap between the expectation that the study of ethics should benefit the researcher, and the results the study, where ethicists appear to not have benefited at all. Why is this so?

An easy way to close the explanatory gap is to cite problems with the studies. For example, while the results of survey 1 remain statistically significant, the limited sample size in the attitudes survey burdened the study with a relatively high margin of error. The findings of the book study need to take into account the fact that ethics books have been in circulation longer, and are more frequently borrowed than books in metaphysics and epistemology. However, for the purposes of this presentation I want to treat the studies as relatively reliable. While they are not immune to methodological criticism, they have withstood more superficial attacks. For example, Schwitzgebel has shown that even when controlling for variables such as popularity and age, ethics books remain significantly more likely to be missing from leading US and British academic libraries.

The books-study appears to vindicate the opinions of those in the attitudes survey that felt that such study made no difference to their behavior, or even those who felt that ethicists tend to exhibit a degree of moral deviance not found in their counterparts in metaphysics or epistemology. But what are some of the philosophical implications of the above studies?

The generalist explanation of the data

The question concerning the relationship between the study of ethics and the ethicist’s behavior is helpfully recast in more general terms, where theoretical and practical reasoning is seen as standing in various relations to practical wisdom. Theoretical reasoning is directed at an exposition of fact, where the ethicist is particularly concerned with articulating what counts as the good. Practical reasoning is more overtly normative, aimed at distinguishing which among a set of possible actions is the good or right action to perform. Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is a description of competent behavior.

The philosopher may be excused for assuming a fairly tight connection between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, when good action is (ideally) the result of proper deliberation and proper deliberation is only possible if one knows what counts as the good. According to the generalist, general principles ought to guide or direct particular behaviors and these principles are made available to us through an application of theoretical reasoning. Generalism is contrasted with particularism. The difference between the two camps concerns the genesis of practical wisdom: where the generalist sees principles as the ideal source of our moral competence, the particularist will rather cite an acute awareness of contextual factors given by way of socialization, training, etc.

Both Kant and Mill endorse the view that we discover what our particular duties are by way of an application of general, self-evidential knowledge. For example, for the consequentialist, theoretical reasoning discovers that we ought to maximize happiness. The Kantian uses theoretical reason to discover that the Categorical Imperative is the general principle by which correctness is determined. Practical reason then applies one or the other of these principles to determine a specific course of action. This is the generalist view of the relation between theoretical or practical reasoning and practical wisdom, at least insofar as ethics is involved (it is, however, telling that we would not assume that someone with a theoretical understanding of plumbing makes for a good plumber).

I assume that most professors of ethics endorse the generalist claim, which assumes a strong link between theoretical and practical reasoning on one hand and practical wisdom on the other. Indeed it was precisely that assumption which constitutes the contrast-class against which the study findings were deemed surprising or puzzling. Given that knowledge of the good is a condition for reliably good behavior, why is it that (a) we do not assume that ethicists are better than non-ethicists and (b) they don’t in fact appear to be better than non-ethicists?

However, the generalist appears to be able to account for the fact that practitioners of ethics seem to be less morally upright than other philosophers. Some generalists might insist that the general study of ethics is purely intellectual pursuit that has little or nothing to do with their day-to-day behavior. The problem with this suggestion is two-fold. If this was the case, we would only expect ethicist’s behavior to be on a par with that of non-ethicists, not worse, as the data suggest. Moreover, if reasoning is an essential component to practical reasoning then even if the ethicist is no more or less interested in behaving well than the average philosopher, we could at least expect them to behave better in virtue of having more skill in reasoning practically.

To account for the data, then, the champion of generalism must argue, not just that ethicists are largely indifferent to the connection between ethics and their day-to-day lives, but must be antecedently delinquent; ethicists steal more books because, in spite of their training, they are less morally sensitive than those in M&E. Ethicists may know that they need to return the books—which most moral theories tell us is the right thing to do—but fail to heed the call of reason. But why would ethicists be more akratic than non-ethicists? There’s no principled reason to think that, on average, ethicists would exhibit more weakness of will than non-ethicists. Is there a significant difference between ethics philosophers and non-ethics philosophers which would gift the latter with more fortitude?

In casual conversations with both Schwitzgebel and myself a number of philosophers have put forth reasons for thinking that ethicists are prone to be morally lax as compared to non-ethicists, thus saving the generalist position. The explanation usually runs as follows: we are attracted to what we struggle with. For example, psychological counselors become so because they already contend with precisely the sort of complications this kind of study promises to ameliorate. Similarly, prospective ethicists might be attracted to the field precisely because they struggle with what may come more effortlessly for the rest of us. Moreover, this akratic tendency must be so pronounced that it cancels out any gains made by increased deliberative skills that come with studying ethical issues.

I worry about the generalist’s appeal to a kind of prephilosophical delinquency or weakness of will in explanation of the data. Apart from the potential callousness of the suggestion, it seems equally likely that ethicists are attracted to the field, not because of personal ineptitude, but because of a non-deviant interest and competence in ethical matters. We would not, for example, seriously entertain the suggestion that metaphysicians are drawn the field because of a kind of ontological ineptitude not had by their counterparts in ethics.

The naïve particularist explanation of the data

Opposing the generalist are those who endorse moral particularism, which finds its roots in Aristotle. In its strongest form, as advocated by John Dewey, Jonathan Dancy, John McDowell, or S.G. Clarke and E. Simpson [Jonathan Dancy, "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties," Mind 92, no. 368 (1983); ———, Moral Reasons (Oxford [England] ; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993); John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson, Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, Suny Series in Ethical Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)], the particularist denies any place for general principles as a ground for moral action: actions are prompted by the contingent features of the specific context in question. Dancy, for example, endorses a “thorough particularism, according to which our ethical decisions are made case by case, without the comforting support or awkward demands of moral principles”. [Dancy, "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties," 530.] Dewey is perhaps less discreet is his rejection of generalism: “Ready-made rules available at a moment’s notice for settling any kind of moral difficulty . . . have been the chief object of the ambition of moralists. In the much less complicated and less changing matters of bodily health such pretensions are known as quackery”. [John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, in Jo Ann Boydston, ed, 14 John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899–1924 1, 164 (Southern Illinois 1983).]

Aristotle’s phronimos excels at practical wisdom. When Aristotle says that, “practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of knowledge but of perception,” [Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1142a25] at least part of what he is getting at is that phronesis is not typically a matter of theoretical or even practical reflection. The phronimos prereflectively responds appropriately to concrete, particular circumstances. The phronimos acts appropriately, but such action is not normally traced back to an internal process of deliberation. The actions of a phronimos do have a proper causal pedigree, but it is one that ends not with a set of deliberative or cognitive processes, but in the practices and activities of a community. What the phronimos gets from the community is a set of pre-deliberative perceptual skills: she or he learns to see particular situations and instances as among those requiring action, just as a child learns to hear a kind of sound as a telephone call or see someone’s running across a particular line as a touchdown.

Naïve particularism has the resources to explain why a life dedicated to the study of ethical theory might not endow ethicists with practical wisdom. Aristotle provides an account of practical wisdom, as constituted by appropriate behavior, which is causally uncoupled from practical reasoning. Once this link is broken, the postulated connection between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning is, even if it is true, irrelevant. Because practical reasoning is not a condition for practical wisdom on Aristotle’s account, theoretical reflection on the good can neither be a condition for practical wisdom.

The basic idea is that generalism holds that certain reasoning skills are a necessary source of moral aptitude. If—as the study suggests—those who are most competent at these reasoning skills appear, on the whole, no less morally deviant than the rest of us perhaps that points to a flaw with generalism. Aristotle’s account of the phronimos helps us explain why moral philosophers, who theoretically reflect on the good, do not, in fact, behave better than the rest of us: conceptual reflection does not a phronimos make.

There are at least two problems with the naïve particularist’s explanation of the data.

First, if the study actually provides empirical support for an Aristotelian outlook, we would expect that it shows moral philosophers to be no better, but also no worse, than other philosophers. While theoretical reflection is not necessary for appropriate action, nothing the particularist says entails that theoretical or practical reasoning can undermine moral competence. However, the books-study suggests that people who study ethics exhibit morally worse behavior than other philosophers. Can Aristotle’s theory accommodate this datum?

Second, the particularist-generalist dichotomy seems a bit naïve. With the exception of Dancy, McDowell, and Clarke and Simpson, very few philosophers would accede to the suggestion that practical wisdom involves no reference to general principles. Even Aristotle, as we will see, is not a particularist in this strong sense.

An Aristotelian explanation of the data

What role do general principles play in Aristotle’s otherwise particularist account of practical wisdom? Deliberative powers, both theoretical and practical, should be brought to bear in the case of breakdown, where e.g. the phronimos is faced with conflicting goods. Indeed, standard ethical thought experiments such as the trolley case are intended to replicate exactly these sort of situation. Because she or he is faced with an importantly novel situation, a more detached stance is necessary; the phronimos must be capable of theoretical reflection. [Ibid., 1141b10.] But Aristotle wants us to see that a deliberative stance is normally only appropriate in the case of breakdown, when the phronimos does not immediately perceive the right course of action.

So why, if the data is correct, would someone who has dedicated their life to ethical reflection be less morally competent than someone who has dedicated their life to other pursuits? Perhaps an entrenched commitment to generalism, which sees deliberation as a prerequisite for practical wisdom, actually undermines moral competence insofar as it prompts ethical reflection in non-breakdown cases. Something like a “caterpillar effect” could set in, as when experienced drivers start thinking about how they are using the clutch, thus stifling action. The generalist suggestion that we ought to deliberate in cases where deliberation is not normally necessary sets the stage for inadvertent moral omission or oversight, as practical reasoning consumes valuable cognitive resources. The Aristotelian might contend that intellectual gridlock accounts for how ethicists could be less morally competent, without cynical psychological appeals to innate moral delinquency.

The testable consequences of this explanation are as follows. We would not always expect ethicists to be, on average, more morally delinquent than non-ethicists. When it comes down to breakdown cases (trolleys, etc.) ethicists ought to be able to adjudicate the various possibilities for action with more subtly and care than would a non-ethicist. But if generalism extrapolates from the preferred treatment of breakdown cases to the non-breakdown case, and this hyper-deliberative stance undermines our moral competence, then we should expect the ethicist (generalist) to choke in these ordinary, non-breakdown cases. The returning of library books is precisely one of these latter cases.

Returning to the attitudes study

Finally, does the data concerning our attitudes toward the behavior of ethicists shed any further light on the plausibility of Aristotle’s account?

This data points to a kind of stark and puzzling ambivalence we feel regarding the role of theoretical reflection in our activities. On one hand, all but the ethicists seem to be skeptical about the capacity for ethical reflection to make a difference in our day-to-day lives. This skepticism is melancholy, and may betray a kind of unintended sympathy with psychologists Jonathan Haidt’s conclusion that emotion is the dog and reasoning is the tail. [Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.," Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001).] And yet many of these same philosophers will stridently uphold the tenets of the standard, generalist view, which sees an intimate link between deliberation and action. Generalism is, as mentioned, the contrast class against which the data seemed surprising in the first place. If there is such a link between theoretical reasoning and practical wisdom, and we know this, wouldn’t more philosophers speak more favorably about the practical wisdom of ethicists? But the survey data seems to suggest that on some level, we already endorse a kind Aristotelianism: the fact that we don’t assume that ethicists would be better may imply that we already know there is something wrong with generalism.


Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Clarke, Stanley G., and Evan Simpson. Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, Suny Series in Ethical Theory. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.
Dancy, Jonathan. "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties." Mind 92, no. 368 (1983): 530-47.
———. Moral Reasons. Oxford [England] ; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993.
Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct, in Jo Ann Boydston, ed, 14 John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899–1924 1, 164 (Southern Illinois 1983).
Haidt, Jonathan. "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814-34.
McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." In Virtue Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote, 162. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. "Do Ethicists Steal More Books?" unpublished (2007).
Schwitzgebel, Eric, and Joshua Rust. "The Moral Behavior of Ethicists: Peer Opinion." unpublished (2007).